

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY

Poland

REPORT NO.

25X1A

SUBJECT

Miscellaneous Polish Army Information

DATE DISTR.

30 April 1953

25X1C

NO. OF PAGES

4

REQUIREMENT NO.

25X1

REFERENCES

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548

SECRET

-2-

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25X1A

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4. [redacted]
5. On the arch above the main gate of the 2d Tank Regt. caserne in Opole the words "Wojsko Polskie" (Polish Army) were spelled out in metal letters. I have no information on any other barracks or caserne area markings.

Supply and Maintenance

6. Minor small arms repairs, such as the replacement of a firing pin, receiver spring, or front sight, were performed in the unit. Small arms repairs which could not be accomplished by the unit, such as the replacement of a carbine bolt, carbine barrel, or the rebaring of a carbine barrel, were serviced by a depot in the vicinity of Wroclaw /5107N-1702E/. Clothing, equipment, and food supply also were serviced by the same depot. I am not able to locate this depot on a map. Repair on major weapons and third echelon maintenance on vehicles and tanks was made at a repair and maintenance shop in Siemianowice /5018N-1902E/. I have no information on the combat serviceability of Polish equipment or the availability of spare parts.
7. I can give only hearsay information on supply depots and installations and have no information on large depots for divisions and higher headquarters' supply. [redacted] I heard [redacted] that an underground explosives depot was located in Brzeg (Brieg) /5051N-1728E/. [redacted] I heard [redacted] that large dumps of military material were located about 70 km. southeast of Warsaw. He did not know what kinds of military material or how much. [redacted]
- [redacted] representing one of the units to which the distributors catered, told me that there was an ammunition dump at Jastrzebie /5203N-2215E/. I have no further information on the dump. I have no information on POL supply, supply procedures, or changes in supply procedures.

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Soviet Influence

8. I do not know whether or not Soviet officers in command of Polish units received orders and instructions from some other Soviet officers, but I assume that they were assigned to a Soviet headquarters in Warsaw and were attached to Polish units upon orders of the Polish Ministry of Defense. Soviet officers in command of units kept themselves apart from Polish officers and, as far as I observed, Soviet officers exercised only the authority commensurate with their rank. From observation and hearsay, I concluded that the Polish officer in 1950 resented the presence of Soviet officers more than at any time prior to that year. Soviet officers in Polish units and schools spoke Polish poorly and wore Soviet uniforms. [redacted] commands for close order drill, marching, and instructions in all military subjects were in the Polish language. According to hearsay information, the Polish language was in use in Polish units [redacted] Polish officer friends and NCOs informed me in 1950 that Soviet officer supervisors and instructors were used at NCO and officer schools in Poland, because there was an insufficient number of qualified Polish officers to take over such positions. The caliber of the Polish Army officer had not improved much since 1950 and many were very young, lacking formal education and with little experience. In the 1950 to 1952 period, a Polish officer established as being politically reliable received a higher position than one who may have excelled militarily but lacked the necessary political reliability.

25X1

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SECRET

-3-

25X1
25X1A

9. I believe that the Polish Army was being patterned after the Soviet T/O & E at the time I was in the service in 1950. Instruction on Soviet weapons was given in the Polish language, and data on weapons was translated from Russian into Polish. New regulations, a manual of arms, and manuals on close order drill and military courtesy, patterned after the Soviet system, but printed in Polish, were issued in the Fall of 1950 and in 1951.
10. I heard [redacted] that Polish males were selected and sent for NCO and officer training to Odessa, Moscow, and other Soviet cities. [redacted] Hq. Co., 2d. Tank Regt. left the regiment on an assignment [redacted] and returned two months later. Some of the officers in the regiment asserted that he had gone to attend a reconnaissance school course in the USSR. On returning to the regiment, [redacted] said nothing about where he had been. [redacted] when I was in Warsaw I saw a small group of Asiatics in civilian clothes. I thought that they were Koreans who had come to Poland for the purpose of obtaining military training. I do not know whether or not Polish Army units were being organized specifically according to Soviet T/O & E.
11. In 1950, most of the weapons and equipment used by the 2d Tank Regt. were of Soviet World War II manufacture. I have no information on the supply of Soviet weapons and equipment that was furnished or promised to any Polish Army unit.
12. I was last exposed to Soviet Military propaganda in 1950. According to information supplied by Soviet propaganda, the role of the Polish Army was to prepare itself to fight any and all invaders, to be able to defend Poland well, and to train itself to fight for and to preserve Polish democracy. Political indoctrination lectures stressed collectivization in Poland; historical studies of BIERUT, LENIN, STALIN and ROKOSSOWSKI; imperialism of the West; living conditions in the West; the Battle of Lenino; and the spirit of new Poland. Soldiers were cautioned to listen attentively to the lectures and not to question what they heard.

Purges

13. I heard and read in Polish newspapers of Polish generals' conspiracy against the Polish state. Generals SPYCHALSKI, MOSSOR, TATAR, and others whom I can not remember, were involved in the conspiracy which was uncovered in 1948. The trials of the conspirators began in 1951 and had not been concluded [redacted]

Morale

14. I cannot cite or describe any specific incidents indicating the morale of the Polish Army in 1950. In 1951 and 1952, I neither heard of nor saw any incidents.
- a. Officers and regular Army NCOs received one 30-day leave each year. Volunteer EM were given some furlough consideration. However, the application for and the final approval of furloughs for volunteer EM was a long process. Draftees could obtain a furlough only in case of an emergency. Draftees could be given a pass or a very short furlough lasting two to three days, provided they fired "expert" on the rifle range, or excelled as students at military schools. When on pass all EM were restricted to an area within 50 km. of their home station. Passes were good for 48 hours, and the regular Sunday pass was from 1500 to 2200 for privates and from 1500 to 2400 for NCOs. The differentiation was resented by draftees.

SECRET

- b. Soldiers in the tank battalion felt proud that they were in such an organization and sometimes spoke disparagingly of EM in other units of the regiment. Consequently, while the tank battalion personnel had good esprit de corps, EM from other units did their work because they were required to do so.
- c. Compliance with disciplinary regulations was in part due to fear.
- d. The principal form of punishment was confinement in the guard-house for periods of one week or longer. This was the punishment for slight misdemeanors such as being a few minutes late from pass, showing evidence of drunkenness, behaving ridiculously while in marching formation, etc.
- e. The food norm continued getting poorer [] and EM who had been in the service since 1948 were dissatisfied. Inductees [] expecting a better fare, were quickly disillusioned.

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- f. The currency devaluation [] in Poland caused resentment among military personnel since the buying power under the new valuation was considerably less than under the old. The following represents the monthly pay scale as known to me []

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<u>Rank</u>	<u>Old Scale</u>	<u>New Scale</u>
Pvt.	200 zloty	6 zloty
Sr. Rifleman	300 zloty	9 zloty
Cpl.	500 zloty	12-15 zloty
Jr. Sgt.	12,000 zloty	360-400 zloty
Sgt.	15,000 zloty	400-450 zloty
Sr. Sgt.	17,000 zloty	450-500 zloty
WO	18,000 zloty	500 zloty
2d. Lt.	20,000 zloty	600 zloty
1st. Lt.	25,000 zloty	750 zloty
Capt.	28,000 zloty	850 zloty
Maj.	30-40,000 zloty	900-1,200 zloty
Lt. Col. (CO of Regt.)	60,000 zloty	1,800 zloty

- g. Although the practice of religion was not expressly forbidden to personnel in the 2d Tank Regt., everything possible was done to curtail religious interest. Extra duty, the scheduling of political talks for Sundays, and the creating of a negative attitude toward religion by planting decriers of religion among the soldiers were used to discourage religious belief and the attending of religious services. Catholics, as a group, were singled out for ridicule and persecutions and they found the curtailment of religion and religious services most objectionable.

- h. [] soldiers were permitted to attend the caserne movie, to listen to public address recordings, to take part in dayroom political propaganda discussions and sports activities.

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